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More Questions about Terrorism
By Rustam Chiharro (1)
Two recent acts of terrorism, the hostage drama in Moscow’s musical Nord-Ost on 23 
October 2002 and the suicide attack against the pro-Russian administration building in 
Grozny on 27 December, have left a great many questions unanswered. The author 
went to Chechnya recently to learn more about the circumstances of these crimes.
Dubrovka: portrait of a terrorist
Aishat Bakueva was born in Il’inovka near Grozny in 1973, the fourth of six children. In 
the Summer of 2001, Aishat’s brother, Bauddi Bakuev, a famous commander who was 
considered close to Chechen Vice President Vakha Arsanov, was killed by federal 
forces near Argun (2). That was the first casualty in Aishat’s family. A few months later 
her brother Aslan and brother-in-law Khassan were killed. The third brother, Idris, was 
killed during a "cleansing." Aishat’s sister, Zareta, died soon thereafter from a heart 
attack. Finally, in May 2002, Aishat’s youngest brother, the 15-year-old Daud, was 
caught laying a landmine on a road north of Grozny by federal soldiers and the 
Chechen OMON. The family never recovered Daud’s body.
Only Aishat and her mother, Datu, remained. Neighbors recall that Aishat did not cry at 
the funerals and avoided going to the cemetery to visit her siblings’ graves. The 
neighbors considered Aishat a Wahhabi and reproached Datu for having failed to raise 
her children properly. The rebukes grew louder and more venomous after the 
circumstance of Daud’s death became known, since local civilians are the usual victims 
of landmines.
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After Daud’s death, Aishat was rarely in Il’inovka. According to Datu, she was too busy 
with her little pharmacy in Grozny. Aishat really did run a pharmacy and even traveled to 
neighboring republics to purchase medicine, but neighbors suspected that she was 
helping Wahhabi units to carry out diversionary maneuvers against the military.
In October 2002, Aishat sold her pharmacy to a friend. She told her mother she was 
going to Moscow on business. A week later neighbors recognized Aishat on television 
among the female terrorists in the Nord-Ost hostage-taking; one of her few friends who 
talked to the author says that Aishat never intended to return. The type of documents 
she may have used to get to Moscow is not known.
Datu categorically refuses to talk to journalists about her daughter. Once a week she 
travels to Grozny’s one public telephone station "to call Aishat." Each week, the 
telephone operator dials the 11 digits of the Moscow mobile phone only to hear, "the 
number has been disconnected." Each week, Datu returns to Il’inovka and tells the 
neighbors, "Aishat sends her best regards. She bought a pharmacy in Moscow and is 
doing very well."
Datu is not alone in her self-deception. The federal government suffers from the same 
malady.
Grozny: a roadmap of the attack
On 27 December 2002, two trucks bearing suicide bombers blew up the Russian 
administration building in Grozny, killing 83 persons. The government compound, 
containing the buildings of the administration and government of Chechnya, the Ministry  
of Justice, the Interior Ministry, the Procuracy and the Regional Directorate of the FSB, 
are located in the Staropromyslovky section of Grozny. The territory around the 
government buildings is not residential; it is surrounded by federal forces. Moreover, 
adjacent to the administration building is the regional FSB headquarters, which is 
equipped with external video cameras. There has been no release of information as to 
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whether the cameras were working the day of the blast, and if so, what has become of 
the tapes.
Procuracy investigators insist that the trucks with the explosives came from the direction 
of the Staropromyslovky district. The main reason they give for this supposition is that 
two trucks bearing a ton of explosives could hardly have passed through the center of 
the city undetected. But even if they were coming from the assumed direction, the two 
trucks still would have had to pass three checkpoints off the main road, 
Staropromyslovky shosse, to reach their target.
Let us suppose that the two vehicles — a heavy "Kamaz" truck and the jeep "Uaz" — 
did indeed come from the shosse. Hence, they would have turned left past the traffic 
police post onto Garazhny Street. To reach the complex of government buildings, they 
would first have to pass the outer checkpoint manned by 10-15 MVD soldiers who 
check the documents of drivers and all passengers.
The two vehicles would have passed this checkpoint and continued down the road, 
passing the headquarters of the Sverdlovsky OMON. (3) Then the trucks would have 
proceeded past the republican Procuracy building, which is guarded by the special 
forces of the justice ministry (GUIN) that also protect visiting federal officials. Most of the 
territory adjacent to the Procuracy, including the road on which the trucks passed, is 
under constant surveillance by armored personnel carriers.
According to the scenario, the two trucks drove past the headquarters of the republican 
FSB (in charge of counter-terrorist operations), which is equipped with external and 
internal video cameras. Roughly 100 meters from the FSB Directorate and 150 meters 
from the GUIN is the only functioning hotel in the Chechen capital which is intended for 
the various VIPs who occasionally visit. The hotel is protected by the GUIN and also 
has external video cameras.
3
The second checkpoint consists of a cement wall with a gate that is guarded by an 
armored personnel carrier and a special purpose unit of the MVD.
The third and final kontrol’no propusknyi punkt (KPP, or checkpoint) actually consists of 
two barriers. The road between them is roughly 50-60 meters long and is not straight, 
but rather has a "snake" design — there are cement blocks forcing drivers to make 
several sharp turns before reaching the last checkpoint. Supposedly, the terrorists 
picked up speed in the "snake" and, having made a sharp left turn, rammed through the 
last checkpoint.
All traffic is checked at the entrance to a KPP. If a vehicle tries to ram the checkpoint, it 
collides with cement and metal gates that would constitute a serious impediment even 
to an armored personnel carrier. If a vehicle does manage to force its way through the 
checkpoint, it would hardly make it halfway through the "snake" before coming under 
fire. The last checkpoint is guarded by FSB, GUIN, and several German shepherd dogs 
especially trained to sniff out explosives. After this last barrier, the distance to the 
administration building is 80 meters.
It is much more realistic to imagine a scenario in which the two trucks packed with 
explosives and driven by terrorists passed unimpeded through all three checkpoints. 
Probably the drivers had all the proper paperwork. It is also likely that the trucks 
belonged to one of the garages on the premises of this governmental compound.
There is an inquiry into the question of who may have provided documents for the 
terrorists, but it will most likely lead nowhere. First of all, nothing is left of the trucks and 
the terrorists; moreover, the whole affair has resulted in another round of detaining more 
"suspects" in the course of the "cleansings." Initially, the head of the Russian-installed 
Chechen Administration accused Aslan Maskhadov. Later, Shamil Basaev took 
responsibility for planning the car bombing. (4) The accusation and the claim of 
responsibility are fairly routine and should not be taken at face value — such statements 
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are part of the rhetoric of the war and may in fact have little to do with how the terrorist 
acts were organized.
The explosion on 27 December may have been the loudest, but was hardly the most 
significant success of the Chechen fighters over the last 18 months. In August 2001 
there were near-simultaneous attacks on commandant buildings in Shali, Argun, Urus-
Martan, and Gudermes which destroyed the military headquarters of those towns, killing 
hundreds of servicemen. In the winter of 2001-2002 at least half a dozen helicopters 
were shot down within 300 meters of the main Russian military base at Khankala. 
(Officially the helicopters crashed due to technical problems or adverse weather 
conditions.) Then, in September 2002, the government was forced to admit that fighters 
had shot down an MI-26 transport helicopter carrying more than 100 passengers. After 
that attack, the number of servicemen in Grozny was increased substantially and 
apartment buildings near Khankala were razed.
These governmental measures, however, do not address the problem. The main 
weakness of the federal force is precisely the large numbers of servicemen massed on 
the tiny territory of the Chechen capital, in particular their many chains of command and 
their total immobility. The temptation of easy money is all around. The military chaos in 
Chechnya is an all-encompassing phenomenon and, because of that, crimes such as 
selling documents, weapons, or trucks to the fighters will never be solved. Greed 
triumphs over fear — this is one of the fundamental reasons for the Chechen fighters’ 
success.
After the December attack on the administration building the authorities decided to 
intensify security measures further by cutting off all civilian traffic on Staropromyslovky 
shosse — the road that connects the city center with the government compound and the 
suburbs to the north and east of Grozny. This clever arrangement sends all civilian 
traffic, including buses, along an alternate route, which is barely passable and adds an 
hour to the commute. Only three weeks after these measures were in place, fighters 
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blew up the Grozny medical school located 100 meters from the heavily guarded 
perimeter of the government complex. 
(1) Rustam Chiharro is a Moscow-based freelance journalist writing from Nazran, 
Grozny.
(2) Bauddi Bakuev was suspected of holding hostage the Russian MVD General 
Gennadi Shpigun. — Ed.
(3) Regional OMON detachments deploy for six-month tours in Chechnya. In this case 
the Sverdlovsky OMON was performing the duties of the Temporary Operational Group 
of the MVD for the Leninsky rayon of Grozny.
(4) <www.kavkaz.org.uk>, 25 February 2003.
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